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CIA FOR WINPAC  
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA  
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP  
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP  
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP  
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):  
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 23, 2009 MORNING  
SESSION

REF: A. GENEVA 00511 (SFO-GVA-II-001)  
[1](#)B. STATE 60487

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-003.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: June 23, 2009  
Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)3. (S) Russian HOD Antonov began the meeting by saying that the Russian-proposed edits of the U.S. Joint Understanding tabled in Moscow were an attempt to harmonize the Russian and U.S. approaches as much as possible and to maintain "constructive ambiguity" in some areas, for later negotiation. He added that it is unlikely that we would resolve all differences in definitions. As for the definition of Strategic Delivery Vehicles, Antonov said that the Russian use of the term included ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and the Russians understood that the U.S. wants to include the associated launchers. United States HOD Gottemoeller responded that the U.S. was drawing from existing START definitions where possible. Antonov added that it made sense for the Sides to "nail down" definitions and that the Russians agreed to use START terms where possible.

14. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain how, if the term "launcher" were to disappear from the treaty, the Parties would be able to verify the limits on missiles. Antonov said that he could not answer right away but noted that there had been a question on sub-limits on launchers. All he could say was that the Russian Side was prepared to discuss this during the negotiations. Warner reminded Antonov that the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding was formulated using the existing START text as the Russian Delegation had suggested. Trout said that since the Russian definition of Strategic Delivery Vehicles did not include launchers, did the Russian-proposed limit of 500 Strategic Delivery Vehicles include both deployed and non-deployed missiles. Neither Antonov nor Ilin could answer the question and deferred it to a later meeting.

15. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov why the Russian draft used the term "interdependence" when addressing strategic offense and defense when President Medvedev had used the term "relationship" with regard to strategic offensive and defensive arms. Antonov replied that "interdependence" better reflected what the Russians want in the treaty and reminded Gottemoeller that Medvedev said Russia would only make reductions if the United States addressed all of Russia's concerns. Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. position remained clear that there would only be a single mention of defensive arms in the treaty and that would be in the preamble.

16. (S) Elliott explained that the United States cannot agree

to the Russian proposal to ban ICBMs and SLBMs with conventional warheads and that the U.S. believed appropriate verification and transparency measures could be developed to satisfy Russia's concerns.

17. (S) Gottemoeller explained that it was important for both Sides to understand how delivery vehicles and warheads were counted. Warner provided a detailed explanation of how the U.S. had more than 300 START-accountable missile silos, submarine launch tubes, and heavy bombers that cannot be used to deliver nuclear weapons and that such "phantom" delivery vehicles need to come "off the books." Gottemoeller added that there were situations with regard to Russia's forces where such "phantom" delivery vehicles also existed. The United States and Russia structured their forces differently and the U.S. needed more delivery vehicles to maintain its force structure while the Russians needed fewer delivery vehicles to maintain essentially the same number of warheads.

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OPENING REMARKS  
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18. (S) Antonov welcomed the U.S. Delegation back to the Russian Mission for day two of the third round of negotiations. He expressed his hope that the Russian proposal for the Joint Understanding (REF A) did not ruin the U.S. Delegation's afternoon but was sure we had a good discussion. Antonov stressed that the U.S. should not try to read between the lines of the Russian proposal and there was not a hidden bottom-line in their position. The Russian proposal tried to provide maximum details while preserving "constructive ambiguity." Additionally, the Russian Side thought the Joint Understanding would give the Presidents an opportunity to help the Delegations take a step forward and, after a break, the Delegations could continue the negotiations in a more deliberative atmosphere (Begin comment: That is, not having the Moscow Summit deadline. End comment). Antonov concluded by stating that the Russian Side was prepared for a constructive discussion of both proposals.

19. (S) Gottemoeller confirmed that the U.S. Side had a busy but not ruined afternoon. She mentioned she had re-read Russian President Medvedev's Amsterdam statement and noted that it provided a good guide for the Delegations'

discussions. She highlighted Medvedev's challenge that the new treaty be a "totally objective, absolutely specific and at the same time binding agreement."

¶10. (S) Gottemoeller proposed that the U.S. Side take the AM session to ask questions to clarify the Russian position on its proposed Joint Understanding (Ref A). She proposed that, in the afternoon session, the U.S. Side could return with a draft text combining both Sides' positions. Antonov accepted this proposal.

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U.S. DELEGATION QUESTIONS ON  
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED CHANGES TO  
U.S. DRAFT JOINT UNDERSTANDING  
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¶11. (S) Gottemoeller began by addressing numbered paragraph

1 in the Russian text regarding its formulation on central limits of Strategic Delivery Vehicles. Specifically, she pointed out that, in the original U.S. draft proposal (Ref B), the U.S. Side used language from the START Treaty ("Deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers"); in the Russian text, it appeared they only addressed the Strategic Delivery Vehicles without the associated launchers. She asked the Russians what was their point in dropping the START terminology in regard to launchers.

¶12. (S) Antonov responded that it was highly improbable that both Sides would resolve all the issues concerning definitions prior to the July Summit. He noted that, in the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding, the U.S. Side used the term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" and that terminology was not used in Moscow Treaty. He also highlighted that the problem of creating that definition had been around for many years. Antonov noted that previously we had been close on such a definition but failed to reach agreement. He deferred any detailed discussion of coming up with a definition to an experts working group at a later time. He concluded his point by stating that it was possible to come up with an agreed definition and the Russian Side wanted to work constructively on developing a common definition as soon as possible, but it might require a new term or change in the content of the definition.

¶13. (S) Antonov stated that the Russian proposal used the general term of Strategic Delivery Vehicle to describe the central limit of the new treaty. He reiterated, from the Russian text, that the Russian Side defined that term as "intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers."

¶14. (S) Gottemoeller asked whether the Russian Side included the launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the launchers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their definition or did the Russian Side suggest that the general term "strategic delivery vehicle" be used in the new treaty? Antonov stated that the Russian Side was still preparing an answer to that question and was prepared to discuss this during the course of the negotiations.

¶15. (S) Gottemoeller said the U.S. Side had used START terminology whenever and as far as possible. She asked what had changed since START went into force to make the Russian Side not want to use the same terminology in regard to the limit on missiles and their associated launchers? Antonov responded, stating that it did not make sense to try to nail down definitions at this time but he agreed START terminology should be used, with the caveat that Gottemoeller had taught him about the "hybrid" and, therefore, it is not easy to decide when the START terminology was appropriate or necessary. He stated that the Russian Side was ready to work with the U.S. Side on the issue of strategic delivery vehicles and to take into account U.S.-proposed terminology on this issue. In any case, the Russian Side was open to any

idea in the interest of arriving at a mutually-acceptable solution.

¶16. (S) Picking up on the mention of hybrid approaches, Gottemoeller stated that concept extended to transparency and verification measures that may have to go beyond what was in

START. She asked if associated launchers disappeared from the new treaty, how did the Russian Side propose to verify the limit on missiles without a limit on launchers?

¶17. (S) Antonov responded that he was in a more advantageous position because President Medvedev's Amsterdam statement gave him specific instructions that the new treaty needed "effectively verifiable" measures, adding that perhaps President Obama would make a statement that could change the situation. Antonov said that he completely supported Gottemoeller's remarks on transparency and openness, noting that this had been the problem the Russian Side had with the previous U.S. administration. He claimed that all the measures he was talking about now included aspects of transparency, openness and verification measures. But, as to whether there would be limits on launchers, the Russian Side was not prepared to talk about it at this time. Experts could find the answers to verification problems as they developed the detailed Treaty text.

¶18. (S) Gottemoeller answered that the U.S. Side's view was that the new treaty covered Deployed Missiles and their associated launchers and Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads. Warner stated that, in the U.S. original non-paper on the Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty, the U.S. central limit was on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Warner continued that the Russian Side had effectively argued limiting warheads alone was not enough. There had to be limits on launchers. The U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding went back to the original START language as the most effective way to capture the entire assembly.

¶19. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian side was still getting used to the hybrid concept, and each Side had its own logic on how to develop the new treaty. He relayed that, after extensive discussion within his Delegation, the Russian Side thought its formulation was best, but he recommended postponing further discussion on the issue at this stage to allow a more detailed discussion by experts later, adding that he did not want the U.S. Side to think that he was ignoring the U.S. logic.

¶20. (S) Antonov also recognized that the first paragraph of the Joint Understanding was the critical paragraph, but said he did not see how the Sides would be able to resolve the complexities before the Summit. Antonov acknowledged how difficult it was for the U.S. Side to come up with numbers for the Joint Understanding and stated that it was also difficult for the Russian Side. However, for the Russian Side, the decision was made at a much higher level.

¶21. (S) Gottemoeller responded that the same higher levels expected the negotiations to resolve the numbers issue and provide figures in the Joint Understanding. She emphasized how important it was to determine how the limits would be counted under the new treaty to understand what actually was being limited. She stated that the U.S. Side would come back in the afternoon with more thoughts on the matter.

¶22. (S) Antonov answered, stating that Medvedev's Amsterdam speech dictated that Strategic Delivery Vehicles needed to be reduced by a significant factor vis-a-vis the START levels, and that associated warheads needed to be below the Moscow

Treaty. Antonov continued that perhaps at this stage of the negotiations it would be better to keep this language very general vice specific numbers.

¶23. (S) Gottemoeller moved on by reiterating that she

believed more concrete options were needed for the Presidents and that the U.S. Side looked forward to further discussions to define Strategic Delivery Vehicles.

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MORE U.S. QUESTIONS  
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¶24. (S) Gottemoeller asked about the Russian terminology in their proposed Joint Understanding concerning the limit "1675 warheads associated with" the Strategic Delivery Vehicles. What was the relationship between warheads and delivery vehicles?

¶25. (S) Again, Antonov said this would be a topic of further discussion, but that the Russian Side had begun to accept the idea of a hybrid treaty and decided to take one parameter from START and one from the Moscow Treaty. He also stated that, to the Russian Side, the reduction of delivery vehicles was more important in the context of the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

¶26. (S) At this point Trout noted that, in the Russian-proposed text, the Russian definition of strategic delivery vehicles did not include launchers. He asked whether the proposed Russian limit of 500 Strategic Delivery Vehicles included deployed and non-deployed missiles? Ilin responded that the Russian Side would think it over and provide a written reply.

¶27. (S) Gottemoeller pointed out that, for the U.S. Side, definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections, and verification procedures for the new treaty would be adapted from the basis of the START Treaty. She asked whether the Russian Side intended using the START Treaty as a basis?

¶28. (S) Antonov agreed that the Russian Side wanted to take the maximum from START as the basis for these measures, to see what was appropriate, but that both Sides would need to figure out together how to make them less costly. However, Antonov said that his formulation would not prejudge this work, so he did not think it was possible to give specific answers while the Sides were just beginning their work. He added that the presentation of the Russian "vision" paper should have demonstrated where the Russian Side had taken whole sections and elements from START.

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NEW RUSSIAN POSITION ON THE  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS  
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¶29. (S) Gottemoeller reserved the right to return to the paragraph on counting rules, but first stated that she would ask a simple question. In the Russian-proposed text on a provision about the relationship between strategic offensive

and defensive arms, why did the Russian Side use the term "interdependence" when Medvedev in his Amsterdam speech used the term "interrelationship?"

¶30. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Side did not have philologists on its Delegation, but he thought interdependence was a better choice of words and captured the essence of the issue. The Russian Side wanted the term interdependence to highlight that it could accept proposed reductions only if Russian concerns were removed, noting that Medvedev's comment about removing Russian concerns referred to missile defense.

¶31. (S) Gottemoeller responded that the U.S. thought it had addressed Russian concerns by agreeing to address the issue in the preamble of the new treaty on the understanding that was to be the only reference to the issue.



132. (S) Antonov replied that there may be a problem as the Russian Side no longer felt that preamble language was enough. Again, he wanted to defer this discussion until the future, but he wanted to understand what the U.S. objections were to the Russian proposal. He wanted the opportunity to understand the U.S. logic and what the differences were. He thought maybe the U.S. did not have a clear position yet, since it had not elaborated its objections. He emphasized that the Russian proposals would only address the interdependence of strategic offense and strategic defense and not be about missile defense. He recognized that Russian concerns about the "'third site" missile defense deployments would not be addressed in the START Follow-on negotiating venue. The U.S. proposal on preamble language was a step in the right direction but not enough.

133. (S) Gottemoeller stated that she thought the U.S. had carried through on addressing Russian concerns by having the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, LTG O'Reilly, visit Moscow to discuss missile defense and the Joint Data Exchange Center as well as the prospect that it could be a topic of discussion for the Presidents at the July Summit

134. (S) Gottemoeller turned to Elliott to provide a further explanation of the U.S. position on the Russian-proposed ban on non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Elliott stated that the U.S. could not agree to the Russian-proposed ban on ICBMs and SLBMs armed with non-nuclear warheads. He acknowledged the Russian concerns and stated that the U.S. believed appropriate verification measures could be developed for such deployed ICBMs and SLBMs that would confirm that nuclear warheads are not deployed on missiles declared to have solely non-nuclear strike capabilities.

135. (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Delegation had prepared an official document on the issue but had not received anything back from the U.S. Delegation. He also stated that the Russians were not prepared at this time to say that the U.S. explanation has removed Russian concerns. He said that the two Delegations should calmly discuss this matter so that each could understand each other's logic, emphasizing that this was one of the most critical problems in the future treaty. As soon as Russia is able to see that the U.S. is able to remove Russian concerns "on treaty paper," it will remove many concerns and it will be easier to

resolve other outstanding issues because it will demonstrate that the United States is prepared to have a constructive relationship based on "equal security."

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CONTINUING THE  
DISCUSSION ON COUNTING  
RULES AND EXEMPTIONS  
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136. (S) Gottemoeller said she wanted to return to the issue of counting rules and why the U.S. thought that the second paragraph of the Joint Understanding must include the basis for calculating limits. She noted that, originally, when the United States arrived at its numbers it noted that it was very possible to not include certain systems in the count. She then turned to Warner to continue the presentation he made in Moscow.

137. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, as delivered in the START January Memorandum of Understanding and noted by the Russian Side at the small group meeting in Moscow on June 15-16, was 1198. Warner highlighted that this number included many delivery vehicles that were no longer in use by the U.S. Side. He noted the following that the United States mentioned in its elements paper.

- 100 Empty Silos.
- 51 B-52 G models that have been cut apart and are no longer

flyable.

- 4 B-52 H models that are in similar condition.
- 96 Launch tubes associated with 4 Ohio-class submarines that have been modified so they cannot carry or launch SLBMs.
- 66 B-1s in the process of being converted to a non-nuclear role that cannot be used in the delivery of nuclear armaments.
- 17 B-1s that will remain in long-term storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ.
- Adding these systems together totaled 334 systems that START accounts for that the U.S. cannot use for the delivery of nuclear armaments.
- Warner pointed out that subtracting this number from the approximately 1200 START-accountable delivery systems showed that the U.S. could not accept a Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle limit below 870. He then highlighted that the actual U.S. requirement was approximately 900 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles when taking into account how the U.S. operationally deploys its Strategic Nuclear Warheads.

¶38. (S) Gottemoeller concluded these comments by pointing out that each Side had two very different arsenals. The U.S. Side pursued the de-MIRVing path as laid out in the START II Treaty (in relation to the ICBM force), but the Russian Federation did not pursue such a path. She noted that this was not a comment on Treaty obligations since the START II Treaty never entered into force, but she wanted to highlight

that there were structural differences in the two arsenals. It was up to each Side to structure its arsenal to meet its requirements and each Side would need to understand that in the future. It was the hope of the U.S. Side that the Russian Side would understand that the United States wanted to remove unused systems under the new treaty.

¶39. (S) Gottemoeller concluded by pointing out that the Russian Side also had approximately 300 "phantom" START-accountable delivery vehicles that could be removed from the new treaty, citing a number of empty SS-18 ICBM silos and empty SLBM launch tubes on Typhoon submarines and Bulava test platforms.

¶40. (S) Both Sides agreed to conclude the morning session and return to the Russian Mission in the afternoon.

¶41. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶42. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller  
Amb Ries  
Mr. Brown  
Mr. Buttrick  
Mr. Couch  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Elliott  
Mr. Fortier  
Col Hartford  
Mr. Johnston  
Mr. Siemon  
Mr. Taylor  
Mr. Trout  
Dr. Warner  
Mr. French (Int)  
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov  
Mr. Koshelev

Mr. Belyakov  
Mr. Ilin  
Mr. Luchaninov  
Mr. Malyugin  
Mr. Neshin  
Col Novikov  
Col Ryzhkov  
Mr. Smirnov  
Mr. Venevtsev  
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

143. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
STORELLA